Episode Seven of the Ideablawg Podcasts on the Criminal Code of Canada: Sections 4(4) to (7) – The Three “S” Words

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Section 4(4) to (7) on The Three "S" Words: Episode 7 of the Ideablawg Podcast

Sections 4(4) to (7) – The Three “S” Words: Episode Seven of the Ideablawg Podcasts on the Criminal Code of Canada

Welcome to the Ideablawg Podcasts on the Criminal Code of Canada. This is Episode 7 and today we will finish discussing section 4 and the three “S” words: subjects, sexual intercourse, and service. The actual podcast can be found at the bottom of this text.

First, let’s turn to s. 4(4) and the word “subjects.” Remember that this section is truly a housekeeping section, whereby a variety of topics are covered, such as stamps as chattels, which we discussed in episode 5 or the meaning of possession in s. 4(3) from episode 6. Up to now, although the subject matters have differed, the subsections have had a definitional theme, meaning the subsections are clarifying the meaning or interpretation of each particular subject matter – stamps and possession being the examples already given.

Section 4(4) is also an interpretation section but is broad in aspect and does not refer to any particular subject matter but instead speaks to generalities. This section does seem out of place with the others and I do wonder why this subsection is not placed under the interpretation sections 1 to 3.

Let’s read section 4(4), which is entitled “Expressions Taken From Other Acts:”

(4) Where an offence that is dealt with in this Act relates to a subject that is dealt with in another Act, the words and expressions used in this Act with respect to that offence have, subject to this Act, the meaning assigned to them in that other Act.

It appears then that section is looking for consistency between Acts: if the Code refers to a subject which appears in another Act, then the meaning of that subject from the other Act is also the meaning of the subject under the Code.

Again, this section is a presumption – a presumption of consistency – the same subject referred to in different Acts are presumed to be the same. However, this presumption can be negated for if the Code defines the subject differently, then the differing meaning of that subject, as found in the Code, prevails.

A good example would be the offences in the Criminal Code relating to the subject of air travel, such as hijacking an aircraft under s. 76. The term “aircraft” is not defined anywhere in the Code but is defined in the Aeronautics Act, another piece of federal government legislation. According to section 4(4), the meaning of “aircraft” under the Code is the meaning of “aircraft” under the Aeronautics Act. So too, the meaning of “pilot in command” under the Code would be the meaning of “pilot in command” under the Aeronautics Act. But here is the twist: the term “pilot in command” only appears in the Criminal Code under the interpretation section 2 under the definition of “peace officer.” Section 2 defines “peace officer” under subsection (f) as:

 the pilot in command of an aircraft

(i) registered in Canada under regulations made under the Aeronautics Act, or

(ii) leased without crew and operated by a person who is qualified under regulations made under the Aeronautics Act to be registered as owner of an aircraft registered in Canada under those regulations,

while the aircraft is in flight.

Thus, the Criminal Code has broadened the definition of pilot in command in certain circumstances to include the power and authorities of a peace officer in dealing with an offender, such as giving the pilot in command arrest powers under s. 495, which are given only to peace officers.

Section 4(5) is also a definitional section, which specifies when sexual intercourse, our second “s” word, has occurred. It reads as follows:

(5) For the purposes of this Act, sexual intercourse is complete on penetration to even the slightest degree, notwithstanding that seed is not emitted.

This is important for a fairly limited purpose: for a present offence in the Code and for a previous offence no longer found in the Code.

To explain this, we need some context so let’s first look at the historical context of sexual assault.

Originally, when the Criminal Code was finalized in 1892, the crime of “rape” was committed by a “male person” who had “sexual intercourse with a female, not his wife” as found in section 266 as follows:

Rape is the act of a man having carnal knowledge of a woman who is not his wife without her consent, or with consent, which has been extorted by threats or fear of bodily harm, or obtained by personating the woman’s husband, or by false and fraudulent representations as to the nature and quality of the act. 

S. 266(3) of the 1892 Code defined “carnal knowledge” as “complete upon penetration to any, even the slightest degree, and even without the emission of seed,” which is pretty much the same definition we now have for sexual intercourse under s. 4(5). Just a year later in the 1893 Code, the definition of carnal knowledge was moved from s.266 and placed under s. 4, but as the Code was amended, the definition moved from s. 4 to s. 7 to s. 3(6) in the 1953 Criminal Code when “carnal knowledge” was changed to “sexual intercourse.”

The crime of rape was finally abandoned in 1982-83 amendments to be replaced by the more general offence of “sexual assault,” being an intentional application of force, of a sexual nature, without consent. Thus the concept of rape, committed by a man on a woman who is not his wife and requiring sexual intercourse, is simply one example of a sexual assault.

This historical context does not however explain why the definition of “sexual intercourse” still remains on the books. As I said the definition remains for a past and present reason. It remains for the past as past convictions for rape and other specific sexual offences requiring the commission of sexual intercourse, such as sexual intercourse with a female under 14 years of age, are “primary designated offences” and relevant in a long term or dangerous offender application under Part XXIV of the Code. The term is also used in the procedure for gathering DNA samples under 487.05 of the Code and in the procedure for gathering sex offender information under s. 490.011.

There is also a clear connection to the present as there are still offences in the Code, which require proof of sexual intercourse as part of the prohibited act or actus reus of the crime. The offences are under the procuring section of the Code and require the offender to either procure or solicit a person to have “illicit sexual intercourse” under s. 212(1)(a) or to entice a person to a bawdy house to perform “illicit sexual intercourse” under 212(1)(b) or as in s. 212(1)(i), apply and administer a “drug, intoxicating liquor, matter or thing with intent to stupefy or overpower that person in order thereby to enable any person to have illicit sexual intercourse with that person.”

Sections 4(6), 4(6.01), and 4(7) are all related to the third “s” word, service, and the proof of when documents have been served on an offender. Sections 4(6.1) and (7) were added to the Criminal Code in 2008. Section 4(6.1) reads as follows:

Despite subsection (6), the service of documents may be proved in accordance with the laws of a province relating to offences created by the laws of that province.

This section was added to the Code to provide criminal law consistency with s. 40 of Canada Evidence Act, which provides for a similar rule in civil cases. Section 4(7) permits the court, hearing the matter, to require the attendance of the person who served the documents for examination or cross-examination on the issue of service.

Section 4(6) is not a new section and is important for the prosecution of driving over 80 offences as section 258 permits the admission of a certificate of a qualified breathalyzer technician as proof of the blood alcohol concentration of the accused. However, the document is only admissible if, according to s. 258(7), the accused receives reasonable notice of the intention to produce the document. As the server of this document is a police officer, section 4(6) permits the proof of notice by documentary evidence, which is certified in writing by the police officer. Section 4(6) reads as follows:

For the purposes of this Act, the service of any document and the giving or sending of any notice may be proved

(a) by oral evidence given under oath by, or by the affidavit or solemn declaration of, the person claiming to have served, given or sent it; or

(b) in the case of a peace officer, by a statement in writing certifying that the document was served or the notice was given or sent by the peace officer, and such a statement is deemed to be a statement made under oath.

This section, which essentially relieves the Crown from calling the officer who served the documents, has not gone without some controversy in case law. Some cases suggest the written statement as contemplated by s. 4(6)(b) is not enough to show proof of service of the notice of intention to produce a breathalyzer certificate, particularly where the serving officer is called to testify and he has no independent recollection of serving the notice. For further reading on this issue read R v Graham.

That is the end of my discussion of section 4 of the Criminal Code found under Part I, the General Part. In the next podcast, I will onto section 5 where we will consider military matters.

Ideablawg Podcast Episode 7 on sections 4(4) to (7) on The Three "S" Words

Section 4(3) Possession – An Example of Judge-Made Law: Episode Six of the Ideablawg Podcasts on the Criminal Code of Canada

I ended last episode with a bit of a teaser: I said in this episode we would explore the old adage: possession is nine-tenths of the law. Well, sorry to say, this is not the law, particularly in the criminal law meaning of “possession.” What we will explore in this podcast is what section 4(3) tells us about the meaning of “possession” and what it does not.

Once again, we will encounter the difficulty of using the Criminal Code as an inclusive repository of criminal offences. According to section 9 of the Code, which we will be discussing on these podcasts very soon, all crimes in Canada are in the Code, except for the common law crime of contempt of court. However, although all crimes are found under a particular section of the Code, on the plain reading of a particular section one cannot be certain of the requisite elements. Sometimes, we need to look elsewhere in the Code for further illumination, such as s. 2 definitions or the definitions found under the relevant Part.

More often, we need to look at case law for the answer. This reality suggests the concept in s.19 of the Code, that ignorance of the law is no excuse, is a bit of a joke, as certainly the average reasonable person, who has no legal training, could not access with certainty the requirements for each crime. This is even more evident when case law does not just define certain words used in a section but actually reads into the section additional words.

This is the case with the s.4 (3) meaning of “possession.” This section is a perfect example of how the Courts have restricted or narrowed the prohibited act of a crime, as originally conceived by Parliament, through legal interpretation. Of course the courts do not do this whimsically. There is a method to their madness and the modifications ensure the integrity of the criminal law as a whole. In the case of possession the added requirements ensure the law is not overly broad and does not capture those whom we would consider legally and perhaps, although not necessarily, even morally innocent. The big puzzle is why Parliament doesn’t take the hint and, in the next round of omnibus Criminal Code changes, amend the section accordingly. To not do this smacks of “ostrich-in-the-sand” kind of mentality. Or better yet, is to liken the attitude to the Ravenous Bugblatter Beast of Traal from the Hitchhiker’s Guide To The Galaxy– what you can’t see isn’t there.

In any event, with this lengthy introductory rant, let’s look at section 4 (3), which reads as follows:

For the purposes of this Act,(a) a person has anything in possession when he has it in his personal possession or knowingly(i) has it in the actual possession or custody of another person, or(ii) has it in any place, whether or not that place belongs to or is occupied by him, for the use or benefit of himself or of another person; and(b) where one of two or more persons, with the knowledge and consent of the rest, has anything in his custody or possession, it shall be deemed to be in the custody and possession of each and all of them.

What we really want to focus on is the concept of joint or constructive possession under s. 4 (3)(b), which requires “knowledge and consent.” The difficulty with this definition started with the Alberta case, from the sixties, Marshall.  The teenager, Daniel Marshall hitched a ride with some friends from B.C. intending to make his way home to Alberta. During the ride, the other teens smoked a hookah pipe filled with marijuana, which Marshall passed along but did not partake. When the Alberta police stopped the car for a broken headlamp, billows of marijuana smoke drifted out of the open windows. Everyone was charged with joint possession of marijuana on the basis of s. 4(3). Marshall was convicted at trial on the basis there was knowledge and consent per the wording of the section. The Alberta Supreme Court, Appellate Division, as it then was, disagreed, finding that consent required more than the mere presence of Marshall in the car and that although he consented to be in the car, that did not mean he consented to the presence of the drugs. Furthermore, the court, in discussing whether or not Marshall was a party to the possession, noted that Marshall had no power to control the people with the drugs nor was he the driver of the car.

This control aspect was applied directly to the meaning of possession in the 1983 Supreme Court of Canada Terrence case. In this case, the issue was possession of a stolen vehicle and Terrence’s presence in the vehicle as a mere passenger. In referring to and approving of the lower Court of Appeal for Ontario decision in the case, the SCC agreed that an element of control was required for proof of possession. In their view, if control was required for proof of being a party to an offence, then, similarly, control was required for joint possession, which was also a mechanism for deeming multiple parties legally responsible for a crime.

This case law restricting the meaning of joint or constructive possession under s. 4(3) does make sense and does ensure that responsibility is properly meted out. However, the concept can be a bit of a stretch. Take for example the 2001 Mraz case from the Saskatchewan Provincial Court wherein the accused was acquitted of possession of marijuana. There the judge found there was no control, even though the accused shared a “joint,” one of the many euphemisms for a rolled marijuana cigarette and apropos here as we are talking about joint possession, with his co-accused. There was no control because the co-accused had full control of the bagful of marijuana from which the previously smoked “joint” came. There was some dispute as to where the bag was found, as the accused believed his co-accused kept it on his person, while the bag was actually found in the car under the seat.

As a quick aside, this leads me to consider the origin of the slang “joint” used to describe a rolled marijuana cigarette. Although I am loath to use Wikipedia, the webpage on the etymology of the slang “joint” seems credible. “Joint,” which is derived from the French word “joined” was used in the 1800s to refer to an annex to a main room. The term picked up an unsavoury flavour when in the late 1800s it was then used in reference to a run-down bar or even an opium den. In the thirties the slang was used in reference to a heroin hypodermic needle because the needle was often shared. The same reasoning is applied to the use of the word “joint” for a marijuana cigarette, as it too, as seen in the cases of Marshall and Mraz, is usually shared.

Thank you for joining me. In the next podcast we will complete our discussion of section 4 when we look at the three “esses;” subjects, sexual intercourse, and service.

Episode Six Ideablawg Podcasts on the Criminal Code of Canada Section 4(3) Possession as an Example of Judge-Made Law

The Acquittal in the Audrey Tobias Case: Confusing Intention With Motive

“Intent” is the exercise of free will to use a particular means to arrive at a particular result. Although in criminal law, we tend to speak of the prohibited act or actus reus as being a separate element of a crime and therefore separate from the fault element or criminal intention or mens rea for a crime, the two are actually inextricably connected. The criminal intention must be viewed in the context of the prohibited act as stated in the Latin maxim: Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea, which means: “There is no guilty act, without a guilty mind.” Thus the actus reus must be some conduct, which puts the guilty mind in motion. Similarly, the mens rea is the legally blameworthy mental or cognitive relationship to the actus reus or prohibited act. One cannot be present without the other for a crime.

Motive, on the other hand, precedes and induces the exercise of free will - it may provide the reason we do what we do – but it is not criminal intent or mens rea. Therefore, it does not matter why someone acted in the way they did, what matters is that they intended to do it for whatever reason.

Let’s take Robin Hood. We may believe that taking from the rich to give to the poor is laudable. Even the judge, when hearing Robin’s robbery charge, may feel Robin’s reasons are compelling. But Robin still committed a criminal offence. He intended to steal with violence, which are the essential elements of the crime of robbery. Robin had the criminal intention at the time he committed the prohibited acts. Robin is guilty.

Now, let’s look at the Audrey Tobias case. Leaving aside any Charter arguments, which by the way were dismissed by the trial judge, Ontario Court of Justice Judge Khawly, and essentially dismissed by the Supreme Court of Canada, albeit not for the same Charter breach, in the refusal of the leave application for Sandra Finlay. Leaving aside the Charter, Judge Khawly dismissed the charge under the federal Statistics Act because the Crown could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt mens rea.

Really? Even Tobias’s counsel, Peter Rosenthal, was surprised to hear that. Audrey Tobias maintained vocally and publically that she refused to fill out the personal information on the census form to protest the use of processing software from a U.S. military contractor. To give the judgment the benefit of the doubt, it may be that through the passage of time Ms. Tobias constructed a reason for refusing and that at the time of the commission of the prohibited act (the refusal or failure to fill out the form) she did not have the required intent. On the other hand, let’s give Audrey Tobias the benefit of the doubt, as the event did not occur that long ago – 2.5 years – and she is an intelligent and sincere person. To paint Ms. Tobias as a frail mixed-up senior is not providing an accurate picture.

There is of course the other problem – the legal one – as the intention required to commit the offence under the Statistics Act is not commensurate with the intention required for a criminal offence. The Statistics Act is a regulatory statute; its primary purpose is to regulate the gathering, analysis, and distribution of statistical information on behalf of the federal government. It is not a criminal law statute. The offences and punishments contained therein are for the purpose of enforcement of the regulations.

As the then Chief Justice Dickson pointed out in R v. Sault Ste Marie, the seminal case on the intention required for regulatory offences, regulatory offences are presumed to require an objective standard of mens rea, called strict liability, which is a form of negligence. Subjective mens rea, the presumed criminal law standard of liability, may be used for a regulatory offence but only if there are clear words used in the section to signify this.

Section 31 of the Statistics Act reads as follows:

Every person who, without lawful excuse,

                  (a) refuses or neglects to answer, or wilfully answers falsely, any question requisite for obtaining any information sought in respect of the objects of this Act or pertinent thereto that has been asked of him by any person employed or deemed to be employed under this Act, or

                  (b) refuses or neglects to furnish any information or to fill in to the best of his knowledge and belief any schedule or form that the person has been required to fill in, and to return the same when and as required of him pursuant to this Act, or knowingly gives false or misleading information or practises any other deception thereunder

is, for every refusal or neglect, or false answer or deception, guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or to both.

Tobias was charged with refusing or neglecting to answer – she was not charged with wilfully answering falsely or knowingly giving false information. Audrey Tobias did not answer at all. “Wilfully” and “knowingly” traditionally are words, which suggests a subjective mens rea standard. However, a neglect or refusal to answer, which is similar in wording to Criminal Code offences involving a failure in a duty such as under s.215 (failure to provide necessities), suggests an objective standard.

In regulatory speak an objective standard of liability is akin to strict liability or negligence. If an offence requires strict liability, there is no necessity for the prosecution to prove the mens rea as the doing of the prohibited act gives rise to an inference that the required mental element is present. It is then open to the defence to show they acted with all due diligence and with all reasonable care. Clearly, on the strict liability standard Audrey Tobias is guilty of the offence.

What does this mean for Audrey Tobias? Although Judge Khawly was well meaning in acquitting her, believing her motives, her character, and her age required it, he erred in law by doing so. Certainly, it is open to the Crown to appeal and most likely the appeal would be successful. However, the Crown should take Judge Khawly’s decision to heart as this case may be one in which the exercise of discretion is warranted.

Section 4 Of Cabbages and Kings and Stamps!: Episode Five of the Ideablawg Podcast on the Criminal Code of Canada

The following is the text of episode 5 of the Ideablawg Podcasts on the Criminal Code  of Canada. The podcast is found at the end of the text. Enjoy!

"The time has come," the Walrus said,
 "To talk of many things:
 Of shoes--and ships--and sealing-wax--
Of cabbages--and kings--
And why the sea is boiling hot--
And whether pigs have wings."

- Lewis Carroll from The Walrus and The Carpenter

Welcome to Episode Five of the Ideablawg Podcasts on the Criminal Code of Canada. Today’s episode is a kickoff as we begin to tackle the potpourri we call section 4 – a housekeeping section, which tidies up the various loose ends of criminal law. It brings to mind Lewis Carroll’s poem The Walrus and the Carpenter and particularly the excerpt I quoted at the start of the podcast. But instead of cabbages and kings, we will chat about postcards, stamps, valuable securities, chattels, possession and joint possession, expressions, sexual intercourse, service and notification, and attendance.

But no oysters – theft of oyster beds will come much later down the road – probably next year - when we discuss section 323.

The task today will involve a discussion of section 4 in subsection (1) and (2), and remember we are in Part I of the Code called the General Part. These subsections, as I said, tidy up some of the definitions we encountered in s. 2. Section 4 (1) reads as follows:

For the purposes of this Act, a postal card or stamp referred to in paragraph (c) of the definition “property” in section 2 shall be deemed to be a chattel and to be equal in value to the amount of the postage, rate or duty expressed on its face.

We see a few words in this paragraph that call out for definition. We are told the section is referring to the definition of “property” under that section 2 definition, but the paragraph really begs the question because now of course we also want to know the definition of “postal card” and “stamp” and “chattel.”

First let’s take a look at s. 2(c) “property.” It says:

any postal card, postage stamp or other stamp issued or prepared for issue under the authority of Parliament or the legislature of a province for the payment to the Crown or a corporate body of any fee, rate or duty, whether or not it is in the possession of the Crown or of any person;

That is of course important to know because the term “property” is used throughout the Code. Indeed a simple word search reveals that the word “property” appears in 161 sections of the Code. Take note that the word “property” is not found under s.322, which is the offence of theft, as the crime involves the taking of “anything, whether animate or inanimate.” Property, as defined under s. 2 is much more restrictive, as the definition in (a) and (b) actually refers to itself - “property.” It is only (c) which gives a concrete example of what property may be – postal cards, postage stamp or other stamp issued by the federal or provincial governments.

However, a word of caution: case law has considered the seemingly broad actus reus or prohibited act in the theft section and has overlaid a concept of property. Thus, in the 1988 Supreme Court of Canada Stewart case, confidential information was not considered “anything” in accordance with the theft section. Even so, as explained in the SCC 1992 Milne case, the criminal law concept of property does differ from the civil law, just as the purpose of criminal law differs from the purpose of civil law. More on this when we get to that section.

So s. 4(1) is adding onto that (c) definition – clarifying it for us – by advising us that “postal cards, postage stamp or other stamp” is a chattel with a value equal to the amount expressed on its face. So if you have a stamp for 5 cents its value is 5 cents. Now, that may be a problem as I now purchase stamps with no number value but with a “p” embossed on a nice red maple leaf placed in the stamp’s corner, which, so the post office assures me, means the stamp is “permanent” and can be used anytime as it is worth the going rate no matter when it is used or when it was bought. The other problem is that a 5 cent stamp may actually be a rare stamp and worth much more than the face value. The offender may be charged with theft but which punishment section applies under s. 334? Is it theft of property valued over $5000, which is an indictable offence and punishable by a maximum of ten years? Or is the stamp valued under $5000, which is a summary conviction offence with a maximum of eighteen months imprisonment?

To answer that question, we need to look at the definition of “stamp.” “Stamp” is only defined under the counterfeit stamp section 376 as “an impressed or adhesive stamp used for the purpose of revenue by the government of Canada or a province or by the government of a state other than Canada.” Not a very helpful definition for the police who want to charge the thief with the theft of the priceless 5 cent stamp, which is worth over $5000 dollars.

The next question is: what is a chattel and why does this section 4(1) insist on deeming the post card and/or stamp as one?  A chattel is an item of personal property, either animate or inanimate, which is moveable as opposed to real property, which includes land and improvements, which is not moveable. For example, when you purchase a house, which is real property, the items inside the house tend to be chattels, like the furniture, unless it is affixed to the house like the glass fireplace doors. Those items affixed to the real property stay and those, which are moveable, the chattels, usually go with the seller unless the item is specifically referred to in the purchase agreement. What does this mean for our postal card and stamp? It means these items are personal property even though they are government issued. Also they are moveable and thus chattels.

Onto s. 4(2) for which the marginal note explains is on “value of valuable security.” This subsection helps us determine the value of a valuable security, where value is material, in the context of the Criminal Code by expanding on the definition as found under section 2. So the purpose of this subsection is similar to subsection (1). Before I read this subsection, let’s go to the section 2 definition that reads as follows:

“valuable security” includes

            (a) an order, exchequer acquittance or other security that entitles or evidences the title of any perso

(i) to a share or interest in a public stock or fund or in any fund of a body corporate, company or society, or

(ii) to a deposit in a financial institution,

(b) any debenture, deed, bond, bill, note, warrant, order or other security for money or for payment of money,

(c) a document of title to lands or goods wherever situated,

(d) a stamp or writing that secures or evidences title to or an interest in a chattel personal, or that evidences delivery of a chattel personal, and

(e) a release, receipt, discharge or other instrument evidencing payment of money;

 Section 4 (2) further defines “valuable security” as:

  (a) where the valuable security is one mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) of the definition “valuable security” in section 2, the value is the value of the share, interest, deposit or unpaid money, as the case may be, that is secured by the valuable security; 

(b) where the valuable security is one mentioned in paragraph (c) or (d) of the definition “valuable security” in section 2, the value is the value of the lands, goods, chattel personal or interest in the chattel personal, as the case may be; and 

(c) where the valuable security is one mentioned in paragraph (e) of the definition “valuable security” in section 2, the value is the amount of money that has been paid.

How ironic that the purpose of this subsection is to clarify the intrinsic value of the security as opposed to subsection 1, which speaks only of face value. Of course this kind of clarity is required as the valuable security may be a deed to property, which is a document showing land ownership, and is therefore merely a representation of the actual property. Thus, the deed itself is a piece of paper with very little value but it represents much greater value in accordance with the value of the actual land.

For those of you wondering what “exchequer acquittance” means, the term comes to us from English law, in fact I found a similar definition of “valuable security” in the Irish Larceny Act 1861. The “Exchequer” is the Royal Treasury. Originally, the Exchequer was also a Court of Law concerned with revenue, like our Tax Court, but later merged with the then King’s Bench. As a government department, the Exchequer was in charge of the national revenue of the United Kingdom. An “acquittance” is a document, which acquits or discharges an obligation and acts as a “receipt in full.” So an “exchequer acquittance” is a receipt for payment of revenue to the government. Clearly, the relevancy of this term today is questionable. Just another example of how our Criminal Code needs to be streamlined and updated.

On that note, I will end this podcast with Shakespeare’s Henry the IV, Part I Act 3 Scene 3 and an exchange between Sir John Falstaff and the future Henry V or as he was known then, Prince Hal, wherein they discuss Falstaff’s bumbled robbery and the positive resolution of it at court. By the way, as an aside, that is a Shakespeare aside, the PBS Hollow Crown series presenting the history plays of Richard II, Henry IV Part 1 and Part 2, and Henry V is outstanding and very worthwhile to watch. In any event, Hal then boasts “I am good friends with my father and may do any thing.” Without skipping a beat, Falstaff urges the Prince to “Rob me the exchequer the first thing thou doest, and do it with unwashed hands too.”

Thank you and come back next time when we continue our discussion of section 4 of the Criminal Code and whether or not possession is really nine-tenths of the law.

Episode 5 Section 4 Of cabbages and Kings and Stamps!